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HOME SOLICITATION SALES-THE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE TO A "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD
I. INTRODUCTION
Door-to-door selling inherently creates many problems
for the consumer who is solicited in his own home. The seller
can exert greater pressure in his selling effort by his intrusion
into the buyer's home environment.' A consumer can leave
an aggressive salesman in the store, but when the salesman
is in the consumer's home, he is not afforded an easy escape
route.2 In a home sale the consumer is further disadvantaged
in not being able to shop around and compare other retail
prices and competing products.3 Finally the consumer at home
has the tendency to treat the salesman more as a guest than
a vendor.4
In addition to these inherent disadvantages to the con-
sumer solicited in his home, the problem of the unethical sales-
man is of major concern and was well stated in the Senate
Committee on Commerce's Report on S. 1599, 5 the "Consumer
Credit Protection Act."6 "[N]o individual preys upon the
elderly, the poor, the ignorant, the gullible, or the softhearted
as much as the unscrupulous door-to-door salesman."17 The
Report s classified these unscrupulous sellers into two cate-
gories: (1) the one shot, hit and run seller, which is the most
common,9 and (2) the salesman whose goal is to cultivate a
1. Speech by William E. Hogan, Conmoner Credit in the Seventies, A.B.A.
Seminar, in Chicago, Sept. 18, 1970, in 26 Bus. LAW. 875, 878 (1972). The
speech was entitled "Cooling-Off" LegWslation.
2. 76 YALE L. J. 745, 780 (1967).
3. 20 CONSUMER REPORTS 435 (1955).
4. Id.
5. S. REP. NO. 1417, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). (Hereinafter cited
as S. REP. NO. 1417.)
6. 15 U.S.C.A. §1601 et seq. This act is more commonly referred to as
"Truth-in-Lending." For a comment on the application of this act in the area
of home solicitation sales, see note 31 infra.
7. S. REP. NO. 1417 at 2.
8. Id.
9. The report explains the approach used by the hit-and-run salesman:
His mission is to sell a story, not a product, so his pitch and ap-
proach are carefully rehearsed and perfected so as to disarm his
1
Clarke: Home Solicitation Sales--The Legislative Response to a "Cooling-O
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
COMMENTS
permanent customer, usually in a lower income area.10 The
Senate Committee found that fifteen percent of the consumer
complaints in Chicago and forty percent of those received
by the Rhode Island Consumer's Council dealt with door-to-
door sales." Likewise, officials at Project Moneywise in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported to
the Senate Committee that in low income areas they had
studied, door-to-door salesmen charge five to six times the
amount that local merchants charge for the same consumer
goods.' 2 Even though the majority of door-to-door salesmen
perform a useful and constructive function, the report con-
cluded that such techniques were common in home-solicited
sales and consequently there was an urgent need for regu-
lation.'
3
Similarly, in a recent study of consumer credit problems
in South Carolina,' 4 many of the common abuses which have
faced the home buyer were catalogued: (1) high pressure;
unsuspecting victim. He does not hesitate to ply on sympathy,
shame, or the buyer's conscience, and to capitalize on the igno-
rance or lack of understanding of certain customers, the language
difficulty of the newly arrived immigrant, the confusion of the
harried housewife, or even the fear of the elderly lady or single
girl living alone, in order to make his sale.
S. REP. NO. 1417 at 2.
10. The techniques of the salesman in the second group are well charac-
terized in the report. He cultivates a permanent customer,
[B]y instilling in the customer a feeling of personal loyalty subtly
underscored by a sense of obligation, again rather than emphasiz-
ing the virtues of his product. His apparent concern with the
customer's personal problems, his 'friendly' weekly calls, which
oddly enough, are also convenient for collections, installments,
and pushing new products, and his occasional favors, frequently
merely delaying the collection of an installment, are all designed
to establish this special rapport. Nevertheless, many purchasers
come to regret these dealings when they subsequently realize
how much his merchandise has actually cost them.
S. REP. NO. 1417 at 2.
11. S. REP. NO. 1417 at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. S.C. LEG. COMM. TO STUDY THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE,
SUMMARY REPORT OF FINDINGS OF CONSUMER CREDIT ABUSES, exhibit A, at 24-
39 (1970). The report also dealt with consumer credit abuses in other than the
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(2) outright fraud and deceit; (3) goods and services grossly
overpriced in relation to their value; (4) goods and services
contracted for, but never delivered; (5) free gift come on;
(6) the bait and switch tactic; and (7) phony contests.'1
Many variations of these tactics are used in the sale of a broad
range of consumer goods, from aluminum siding to maga-
zines.' (
The fact that door-to-door sales are on the increase makes
the need to protect the consumer from such abuses even more
apparent.' 7 It was estimated in 1967 that in-home sales pro-
duce an annual income of 28 billion dollars.'"
Thus recognizing the serious problems existent in "home
solicitation sales," the question then arises as to what type of
solution will best counteract the effects of abusive salesman-
ship and meet the needs of the home consumer. From the con-
15. Id. at 25. Some of the examples of the complaints of abuses the Com-
mittee received pertaining to sales solicited in the home are detailed in the
report. In summary form here are several of the actual cases:
(1) A blind Columbia widow, a welfare recipient, was pressured into
signing a contract for aluminum siding, after the salesman wormed his way
into her home by offering $1,700.00 in aluminum siding free. This resulted in
the widow signing a contract for $3,400.00 in aluminum siding, which she
unknowingly secured by a mortgage on her home, and the value of the siding
was later appraised at only $600.00.
(2) A salesman induced a policeman to sign a contract for a portable
swimming pool, obligating him to pay $4,800.00 over the next eight years, only
after a 32 hour sales pitch. The policeman had originally only responded to
a newspaper ad which offered a pool for only $799.00, however the salesman
was unable to "locate" the advertised model once in the home.
(3) Under a pretense that a new law required indoor toilets, several
rural consumers were induced to contract for complete bathrooms, unknow-
ingly mortgaging their home and land. Some of the bathrooms were without
the benefit of a septic tank, some were never installed.
16. Id. at 28.
Other complaints in Committee files and in the Better Business
Bureau files indicate that there are many variations of the above
(supra note 6) fly-by-night selling schemes involving magazines,
encyclopedias, sewing machines, vacuum cleaners, records, stereos,
picture albums, etc., etc., etc .... Many involve valuable secur-
ity interests-others mere contracts.
17. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MoRE 64 (1963).
18. 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 338, 345 & n.7 (1968). This information is in a
letter from H. A. Schatz, Marketing Manager of West Bend, Inc., Member
of Panel of Advisors for Part 5 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, Nov.
2, 1967.
3
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sumer's viewpoint, the obvious convenience of in-home buying
coupled with the widespread acceptance of the technique ap-
parent from the size of the industry, would seem to dictate
against totally abolishing door-to-door selling. As an alterna-
tive to this, the generally accepted course has been toward
regulation of the activity through legislative controls.
Early regulation of door-to-door sales amounted to either
direct control through restrictive ordinances or indirect con-
trol from laws made in related areas.19 Direct regulation took
the form of "Green River" ordinances 2° and "hawker and
peddler" statutes.21 These types of statutes were easily
evaded.22 Legislation indirectly aimed at covering door-to-door
salesmen's activities are sales law, the law of negotiable in-
struments and retail sales acts. 23 Unfortunately, these types
of regulation involve many practical difficulties which tend
to make them ineffective in regulating door-to-door sales and
protecting the home consumer from abuses.24
To avoid these practical difficulties, an alternative ap-
proach was needed, something to neutralize the effects of high
pressure salesmanship and fraudulent practices without abol-
ishing door-to-door selling or greatly increasing the burden
19. For a more detailed study of the early regulation of door-to-door sales,
see 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 338, 339-45 (1968).
20. Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933). The
name came from Green River, Montana. Such municipal ordinances make door-
to-door selling of goods unrequested by the buyer a nuisance.
21. "[T]he business of peddling has been regulated and deemed proper
material for police power regulation as early as 1784.. .. " Sayer Borough v.
Philips, 148 Pa.St. 428, 33 Am. St. Rep. 842 (1892).
22. 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 338, 339 (1968). The "hawker and peddler" statutes
generally exclude local merchants. Modern door-to-door salesmen Would rarely
come within the definition of a peddler, an itinerant salesman with no perma-
nent place of business. Even though "Green River" ordinances include local
merchants, the coverage of the statute can still be thwarted by the salesman
giving the consumer a call prior to his visit.
23. See generally Willer, Protection Installment Buyers Didn't Get, 2
B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. Rnv. 287 (1961); Hogan, A Survey of State Retail
Installment Sales Litigation, 44 CORN. L. Q. 38 (1958).
24. See Cuming, Consumer Protection--the Itinerant Seller, 32 SASKATCHr-
EWAN L. REv. 113, 116 (1967); Note, State Consumer Protection: a Pro-
posal, 53 Iowa L. Ray. 710 (1967). The first article deals with the practical
difficulty of jurisdiction and the second one points out the very real problem
of litigation costs, being a definite deterrent for action by the consumer under
this indirect control approach.
1972]
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on local policing authorities. The duped home consumer us-
ually does not discover his dilemma until he has had time
to reflect on the transaction absent uhe persuasive pressure
of the salesman, read the fine print more carefully, or obtain
from friends or family an objective or more knowledgeable
opinion about the transaction. Consequently, if the consumer
could then rescind his transaction, he could extricate himself
from his predicament and negate the effects of the unethical
salesman. As a result, the idea of a "cooling-off" period
evolved during which the consumer would have the right to
rescind the transaction after the door-to-door salesman's de-
parture. This alternative originated with recommendations
from the English Committee on Consumer Protection,25 which
Parliament later enacted.
26
Similarly there has been a trend in the United States to
adopt the alternative of a cooling-off period as a solution to
the abuses in door-to-door selling. Our first legislative re-
sponse to this idea limited the coverage of the "cooling-off"
period to home improvement installment contracts. 27 Massa-
chusetts later adopted a more generalized "cooling-off" pro-
vision for door-to-door selling in its Retail Installment Sales
Act of 1966.28
As the consumer protection trend gained momentum, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws20 drafted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C).30
Included among the many requirements and limitations in the
field of retail credit sales, the proposed code provided for a
"cooling-off" period in home solicitation sales. 31 Since the
25. Commf. ON CONSUMER PROTECrION, FINAL REPORT, CHND. No. 1781,
1f521 ( 962).
26. Hire-Purchase Act of 1965, c.66, §11(1).
27. MICI. STAT. ANN. §500-201(c) (4) (Supp. 1966).
28. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255D, §14A (Supp. 1967).
29. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) was also a product of this
eminent group.
30. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code generally contains provisions of
several kinds, aimed at protecting the interests of buyers, debtors and lessees.
31. The U3C has two separate areas in which a "cooling-off" period in
home solicitation sales is provided. (1) Section 5.204 provides a right of can-
cellation in cases where the seller obtains a security interest in real property
used as a residence by the buyer, however since this is virtually the same as
section 125 of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act [see note 6 supra],
884 [Vol. 24
5
Clarke: Home Solicitation Sales--The Legislative Response to a "Cooling-O
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
1972] COMMENTS
drafting of the U3C, several states have adopted it, adding
to the general acceptance of a "cooling-off" period.
32
In addition, other states have responded affirmatively to
the idea of a "cooling-off" period in door-to-door selling al-
though without adopting the U3C. Some legislatures have
passed special statutes called "Home Solicitation Sales" acts3a
or "Consumer Fraud" acts3 4 aimed directly at the problem.
Others have enacted retail installment sales acts which incor-
porate a provision for a cooling-off period in door-to-door
selling.
3 5
section 5.204 will not be discussed herein. (2) Part 5 of article 2 [§§2.501-2.505]
provides for a three-day "cooling-off" period, during which time buyer can
give seller written notice of cancellation of the agreement. Part 5 of Article
2 of the U3C is the focus of this work.
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 14A §1-101 et seq. (Supp. 1972); UTAH CODE
ANN. §70B-g-101 et seq. (Supp. 1971); Wyo. STAT. §9-40-1-101 et seq. (Cum.
Supp. 1971); Colo. Laws H.B. No. 1076 (1 CCH CONS. CED L. REP., UCCC
ff5121 (Oct. 1, 1971)); Idaho Laws H.B. No. 219 (2 CCH CONS. CRED. L
REP., UCCC 015121 (July 1, 1971)).
33. ALAsxA STAT. §45.05.125 (Cum. Supp. 1971); APiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§44-5001 to -5008 (Supp. 1972); CAL. Civ. CODE §§1689-.5-.13 (West Supp.
1972) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1969) ; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§501.021-.051 (Cum. Supp. 1972) ; IND. CODE tit. 24, art. 5, ch. 6 §§1-3 (1971) ;
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §§4661-69 (Supp. 1972); MD. CODE ANN. art. 83
§§28-34 (Cum. Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§17:16C-61.1-.9 (1968); N.Y.
PERS. PROP. LAW §§425-30 (McKinney Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAws §§6-28-1
to -8 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. §§59.1-21.1-.7 (Cum. Supp. 1970); Ala. Laws
H.B. No. 2052 (1 CCH CONS. Cani. L. REP., ALA. 116013 (Oct. 1, 1971)), and
in counties with population over 600,000 (according to the 1970 census only
Jefferson County) see Ala. Laws HB. No. 1029 (1 CCH CONS. CRED. L. REP,
ALA. 16351 (Sept. 7, 1971)); Del. Laws. H.B. No. 286 (2 CCH CoNs. CRED.
L. REP., Dmt. 16091 (Aug. 11, 1972)); Ky. Laws H.B. No. 176 (2 CCH CONS.
CRED. L. REP., Ky. 16251 (June 15, 1972)) ; Mich. Laws P.A. No. 227 (2 CCH
CONS. CRED. L. REP., MICH. 16381 (Jan. 3, 1972)) ; Ore. Laws ch. 744 (3 CCH
CONS. CRED. L. REP., ORE. 16241 (July 2, 1972)); S.D. Laws H.B. No. 527
(3 CCH CoNs. CRED. L. REP., S.D. 116151 (July 1, 1971)).
34. ILL. REv. STAT. tit. 121Y §262B (Supp. 1972) ; LA. REv. STAT. §9:2711
(Supp. 1970) (this statute Will be repealed by Louisiana's adoption of the U3C
provisions on "Home Solicitation Sales" effective Jan. 1, 1973); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 73 §201-7 (1968) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 §2454 (Supp. 1971) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §63.14.154 (Supp. 1971); D.C. CODE §28-3811 (2 CCH CONS.
CRFD. L. REP., D.C. 16161 (.Dec. 17, 1971)).
35. GA. CODE ANN. §96-906 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§476-1 to -5
(Supp. 1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §361-B:3 (Supp. 1971); N.C. Laws
Ch. 796 (3 CCH CoNs. CraE. L. RE., N.C. 16301 (Jan. 1, 1972)).
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss5/9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This recent legislative response and the current draft
of the National Consumer Act 36 have produced a variety of
approaches to remedying the problem of the abused consumer
in door-to-door sales. In evaluating protection for the home
consumer, this comment will compare the variations in these
legislative responses and attempt to determine which ap-
proaches provide greater protection. Special notice will be
made of the coverage afforded the consumer in the recently
proposed "South Carolina Consumer Credit Code." 37
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
In comparing the various legislative responses, the U3C
offers a good starting point, because many of the recent stat-
utes seem to be a variation on the theme suggested by the
USC "Home Solicitation Sales" provisions.
A. Scope of the Statutes
The U3C defines a "home solicitation sale" as a consumer
credit transaction at the buyer's residence for goods and ser-
vices. 38 Since "credit sales" must be "payable in install-
ments," 39 cash sales are therefore excluded from coverage.
Similarly, some states have followed this approach and lim-
ited coverage to only credit transactions.40 Previously, the
U3C limited application of the definition to include only credit
sales of $100.00 or more,41 however the final draft deleted
this limitation. Nevertheless, two states followed the earlier
UC approach and included only those credit sales over a
specified dollar figure.42 In addition several states have modi-
36, See notes (98-104) infra.
37. See notes (105-120) infra.
38. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.501.
39. Id. at §2.104(d). In defining a "consumer credit sale" the U3C requires
the sale to be "payable in installments" or a credit service charge levied. "Pay-
able in installments," is defined at §1.301(12), to include sales payable in four
or more installments, including downpayment, where no service charge is made
or payable in two installments excluding downpayment, where a service charge
is made.
40. E.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §426 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §17:16C-61.1 (1968). For example, New York defines a credit sale as
payable in four or more installments, excluding downpayment.
41. UNxIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.501 (tent. draft 1967).
42. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93 §48 (Supp. 1970); S.D. Laws H.B.
No. 527 (3 CCH CoNs. CREa. L. REP., S.D. f[6151 (July 1, 1971)).
[Vol. 24
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fied the credit sale limitation to include those cash sales in
which seller extends buyer a loan or secures a loan for him, to
enable him to purchase the goods solicited.
43
At the same time an increasing number of states permit
coverage of cash sales as well as credit sales,44 however re-
stricting cash sales to those under a certain dollar limitation.46
Going one step further, some jurisdictions have abandoned
even the pecuniary limitation in their coverage of cash and
credit sales.
46
Furthermore, the U3C definition of a "home solicitation
sale" specifically excludes sales of farm equipment,47 a posi-
tion other states have followed.48 In the same manner a va-
riety of other goods and services have also been excluded by
definition, i.e., insurance ;49 motor vehicles;5o goods and ser-
vices used in connection with funeral services ;51 motor boats
and accessories ;52 horticultural equipment;53 and some pro-
fessional services. 54
In addition to these exclusions, the U3C further limits
a "home solicitation sale" so as not to include a sale made
"pursuant to a pre-existing revolving charge account" 55 or
one made "pursuant to prior negotiations between the parties
43. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §44-5001 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW
§426 (McKinney Supp. 1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §361-B :3 (Supp. 1971).
44. It should be pointed out that some states do not make any express dis-
tinction between cash and credit sales, thereby seeming to cover both. E.g., IND.
CODE: tit. 24, art. 5, ch. 6 §§1-3 (1971) ; MAINE REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§4661-69
(Supp. 1972) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 §201-7 (1968).
45. For example, California has a $50.00 limitation and Delaware a $25.00
one.
46. D.C. CODE §28-3811 (2 CCH CONS. CRnD. L. RE., D.C. ff6161 (Dec.
17, 1971)).
47. UNIFORm CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.501.
48. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 33 §34 (Cure. Supp. 1972).
49. E.g., Del. Laws H.B. No. 286 (2 CCH CONS. CRED. L. REP., DEL. f6091
(Aug. 11, 1972)).
50. N.C. Laws Ch. 796 (3 CCH CoNs. CRD. L. REP., N.C. f6301 (Jan. 1,
1972)).
51. Id.
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:16C-61.5 (1968).
53. Mich Laws P.A. No. 227 (2 CCH CONS. CapD. L. RE', MicH. f6381
(Jan. 3, 1972)).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE §1689.5 (West Supp. 1972).
55. UNIFORm CONSUME CREDIT CODE §2.501.
19721
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 9
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol24/iss5/9
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
at a business establishment at a fixed location where goods
or services are offered or exhibited for sale."56 Virtually iden-
tical provisions have been incorporated into a few of the state
statutes.5 7 Generally, however, most states acting in the area
have not used this particular limitation.
Finally, if immediate performance is required by a buyer
due to an emergency, the USC prohibits the cancellation period
if the seller has substantially performed in good faith.58 A
similar provision has been adopted in some states5 9 and a few
statutes additionally require the buyer to sign a separate state-
ment, acknowledging his waiver of a right of cancellation,
before such waiver will be recognized.60 On the other hand,
New Jersey explicitly forbids buyer's waiver of any of his
rights provided for in their statute."'
B. Length of "Cooling-Off" Period
A three-day "cooling-off" period during which buyer can
exercise his right to cancel seems to be the view of a majority
of states and the U3. Despite this general acceptance, four
states have narrowed the cancellation period to only two
days.62 As a variation on this theme, South Dakota provides
for a fifteen business day "cooling-off" period for home study,
correspondence, trade school, and self-improvement courses.
63
C. Cancellation Fee
Once the seller has decided to rescind the sale and does
so within the permissible time, the U3 allows the seller to
retain from buyer's downpayment as a "cancellation fee,' ' 64
56. Id.
57. E.g., N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW §426 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
58. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.502(5) (a).
59. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 83 §29 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
60. VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-21.3 (Cum. Supp. 1972); D.C. CODE §28-3811 (2
CCH CoNs. Cram. L. REP, D.C. ff6161 (Dec. 17, 1971).
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. §17:16C-61.5 (1968).
62. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §44-5002 (Supp. 1972) ; IND. CODE tit. 24, art.
5, ch. 6 §2 (1971); NJ. STAT. ANN. §17:16C.5 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
73 §201-7 (1968).
63. S.D. Laws H.B. No. 527 (3 CCH CONS. Cu. L. REP., S.D. ff6151
(July 1, 1971)).
64. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.504(3).
[Vol. 24
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five percent of the cash price,65 however the fee cannot exceed
the down payment itself. Likewise an identical proviso appears
in a few of the statutes.6 6 It should be noted that in earlier
drafts of the U3C, the cancellation fee was limited to a flat
$15.00,67 however this was deleted in the final draft. Despite
the deletion of this $15.00 ceiling, many legislatures adopted
the idea. The ceiling on the cancellation fee now ranges from
$25.00,68 to $15.00,69 $10.0070 and even $5.00.71 With an eye
to a similar purpose, North Carolina modified the cancellation
fee provision to 1 % of the cash price, not to exceed the down-
payment. 72 On the other hand, many of the states adopted
no cancellation fee provision 3 and the District of Columbia
expressly prohibits one.7 4
D. Disclosure of Right to Cancel
A statement of the buyer's right to cancel must be in-
cluded in the written agreement or offer to buy under the
W3C, which must comply with the specifications of the 133C
sample disclosure form.7 5 The text of this disclosure statement
must also appear under the "conspicuous caption: 'BUYER'S
RIGHT TO CANCEL.' "76 In addition, the U3C disclosure
form not only requires buyer's rights to be spelled out, but
also provides a blank where seller must insert the address to
which the cancellation notice may be mailed.77 Following this
pattern, some of the legislatures have enacted provisions sim-
65. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.110 for a definition of "cash
price".
66. E.g., N.Y. PREs. PROP. LAW §429 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
67. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.504(3) (tent. draft 1967). The
provision stated that the fee would be 59 of the cash price or $15.00, whichever
was less, however not to exceed the downpayment.
68. GA. CODE ANN. §96-906 (1972).
69. CAL. Civ. CODE §1689.10 (West Supp. 1972).
70. MD. CODE ANN. art. 83 §31 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
71. R.I. GEN. LAWS §6-28-5 (1968).
72. N.C. Laws Ch. 796 (3 CCH CoNs. CRED. L. REP., N.C. 6301 (Jan. 1,
1972)).
73. E.g., Del. Laws H.B. No. 286 (2 CCH CONS. CRED. L. REP., DEL. f6091
(Aug. 11, 1972)).
74. D.C. Code §28-3811 (2 CCH CoNs. CRFD. L. REP., D.C. f6161 (Dec.
17, 1971)).
75. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §2.502(5) (a).
76. Id. at 2.503(2) (b).
77. Id. at 2.503 (2) (a).
1972]
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ilar to those of the USC.78 On the other hand, where the legis-
lative response has been generally more limited, the statutes
do not provide any guidelines for disclosing buyer's rights or
dictate in what manner buyer is to obtain seller's address for
exercising the cancellation right.
7 9
In expanding upon the basic theme of the U3C, Hawaii
specifies that the disclosure of the buyer's rights on the sales
agreement be in ten point type and with the seller's address.
In addition, their statute requires a "Notice of Cancellation"
form which may be attached to the sales agreement or sepa-
rate.80 This "Notice of Cancellation" repeats buyer's rights
and may itself suffice as a cancellation form when returned
by mail to seller.81 Along the same lines, New York requires
a perforated card, the bottom half of which must have seller's
name and cancellation address printed on it and which will act
as a cancellation notice if mailed in the allotted time.82 Also
in New York, in the interest of the Spanish-speaking con-
sumer, disclosure of buyer's rights on the perforated card
must be in both Spanish and English in cities with population
in excess of one million. 3 Besides requiring a lengthy articu-
lation of buyer's rights in ten point type in the sales agree-
ment, Rhode Island provides that "additionally the seller shall
at the time of the sale give notice to the buyer of all the buyer's
rights as stated in this chapter."8 4 This focus on the time of
sale itself seems to be the strongest protection available analo-
gous to other warnings before the fact seen in criminal law.
In addition to informing the consumer of the cancellation
right pursuant to a home-solicited sale, the USC disclosure
statement warns the buyer that, "If you cancel, the seller may
78. See statutes cited note 32 supra.
79. E.g., ALASA STAT. §45.05.125 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
80. HAWAIi REv. STAT. §476-5 (Supp. 1971).
81. Id.
82. N.Y. PEis. Paop. LAW §428 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
83. In the report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, it was revealed
that
In New York $400 sets of encyclopedias have been sold to Puerto
Rican parents who cannot read English, by salesmen who have
posed as school officials and told the parents that their children
would be forced out of school if they did not buy.
S. REP. No. 1417, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 (1968).
84. RI. GEN. LAWS §6-28-4 (1968).
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keep all or part of your cash downpayment." 85 On the other
hand, several of the statutes fail to advise the buyer of the
possible retention of a cancellation fee by the seller, even
though making provision for one.8 6 Even where no cancella-
tion fee may be retained at all, some states do not require the
seller to notify the buyer of his rights.81 Following the more
consistent approach of the U3C, the District of Columbia stat-
ute, which expressly denies a cancellation fee, requires this




Some legislative responses to the problem of the home
consumer and the door-to-door salesman have no parallel in
the provisions of the U3C. For example, Delaware expands
the term "door-to-door" to not only include sales solicited in
person but "[A]ny solicitations and consummations of sales
via any telephone. '8 9 As pointed out earlier, Delaware includes
both cash and credit sales of goods and services, $25.00 and
over.90 As a result, the protection of the three day right of re-
scission has been expanded to cover transactions that are also
truly solicited whenever the consumer is in his home environ-
ment.
Even though limited to credit transactions, Hawaii's
statute defines "house-to-house" to include:
[A] sale of goods or services solicited in person or by mail, telephone,
or public or private notice or advertisement if the solicitation includes
an 'offer of a gift, prize, premiums, stamps, coupons, tickets or other
redeemable devices as an inducement for the person solicited or a mem-
ber of his immediate family to go to the seller's place of business,
whether the buyer signs at the seller's place of business or elsewhere.91
This covers the broadest spectrum of methods of solicitation
by including not only face-to-face, but verbal and written
85. UNIFOR, CoNsumER CREDIT CODE §2.503 (2) (b).
86. HAvAI REv. STAT. §476-5 (Supp. 1971).
87. NJ. STAT. ANN. §17:16C-61.5 (1968).
88. D.C. CODE §28-3811 (2 CCH Co s. CraE. L. REP., D.C. f16161 (Dec.
17, 1971)).
89. Del. Laws H.B. No. 286 (2 CCH CoNs. Craw. L. REP., DEL. 6091
(Aug. 11, 1972)).
90. Id.
91. HAwAu REv. STAT. §476-5 (Supp. 1971) (emphasis supplied).
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transactions likely to reach the home. It is also worth note
that under the U3C and all the other state statutes, 92 that a
sale executed at the seller's place of business is excluded. The
Hawaii statutory definition addresses itself to the whole area
of home soliciting, by broadening the scope of the means used
to solicit and where the sale may be consummated, whereas
the other statutory definitions seem to have been greatly con-
cerned with limiting these areas and thus the coverage of their
statutory protection.
Also of interest is Virginia's statute, which approaches
the "home solicitation sale" as a consumer sale of goods and
services or a consumer lease of goods, excluding cash transac-
tions under $15.00 and farm equipment. 93 Similarly, Rhode
Island provides that the right to cancel extends to a sale or
lease of merchandise which was solicited at the buyer's
home.9 4 In an overview, it seems the statutes of Virginia and
Rhode Island broaden their scope by further increasing the
types of transactions covered, whereas the expansion of the
statutory scope in Delaware and Hawaii results from enlarg-
ing the selling methods to be encompassed, i.e., telephone
calling, bait advertising, and the like.
For additional protection of the home consumer, North
Carolina provides in its coverage of "home solicitation sales"
that,
A buyer, who has not received delivery of the goods and services from
the seller . . . within 30 days following the execution of the contract,
shall have the right at anytime thereafter before acceptance ... to re-
scind the contract and to receive a refund of all payments made .... 95
This allows the buyer an additional opportunity to rescind the
sales agreement, however it is inapplicable to cash sales as
North Carolina confines a door-to-door sale to include only
92. UMFoRM CONSUMR CREDIT CODE §2.501; R.I. GEN. LAWS 56-28-2
(1968). The USC limits coverage to sales transacted at buyer's residence.,
whereas other states such as Rhode Island have broadened this approach to
cover sales made at "other than seller's place of business." Similarly, one of
South Carolina's proposals, note 111 infra, followed the latter approach.
93. VA. CODE ANN. §59.1-21.2 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
94. R.I. GEN. LAWS §6-28-2 (1968).
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credit transactions. The focus on delivery seems to be a valid
protection in any event.
Finally, New Jersey allows its "door-to-door sales" pro-
vision to encompass credit sales in which,
[T]he retail buyer has requested the retail seller to conduct a demon-
stration or exhibition at a place other than the retail seller's place of
business and has not also requested to enter a sale at that place at the
time he has requested such demonstration or exhibition.9 6
This would cover buyer-requested home demonstrations. Some
items by their nature must be demonstrated away from seller's
place of business, such as motor boats or motor vehicles, how-
ever demonstrations of these two particular items have been
expressly excluded.9 7
III. THE NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT-AN ALTERNATIVE
PROPOSAL TO THE U3C
The National Consumer Law Center 9s drafted as an alter-
native proposal to the U3C, the National Consumer Act
(NCA) ,99 which goes beyond the U3C provisions by including
cash as well as credit transactions. 0 0 As already pointed out,
the U3C provides for a three-day "cooling-off" period of con-
sumer credit sales, excluding farm equipment, solicited and
completed at the buyer's residence. In sharp contrast to the
U3C, the N.C.A. permits rescission within three business days
after consummation of all credit and non-credit transactions
involving $50.00 or more, entered into by a merchant in his
place of business.'0 What is of even greater significance in
the area of home solicitation sales, the N.C.A. requires affir-
mation within three business days of all credit and non-credit
transactions executed anywhere outside of a merchant's place
96. NJ. STAT. ANN. §17:16C-61.5 (1968).
97. Id.
98. The National Consumer Law Center was established in 1968 and
funded by a $200,000.00 grant from a federal organization. Prof. William Wil-
lier was named director in 1968.
99. "[S]ome consumer groups felt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
did not go far enough in its provisions for consumer rights. The result was the
drafting of the National Consumer Act." Supplementary Information on Testi-
mony by George Gordin on the National Consumer Act, to the S.C. CommiTTE
TO STUDY THE UNIVORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, exhibit C at 52 (1971).
100. NATIONAL CONSUmER AcT §§1.102(2) (a) & 1.102(1).
101. Id. at §2.505.
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of business.10 2 Finally, it expands coverage of the rescission
period from strictly consumer transactions as in the U3C,1
o3
to include transactions where individual proprietors acquire
business equipment and sales of insurance by insurers. 10 4
From this brief comparison of the effects of the U3C and the
N.C.A. in the area of door-to-door sales, it is quite apparent
that the N.C.A. drastically expands upon the protection to
the home consumer.
IV. THE PROPOSED "SOUTH CAROLINA CONSUMER CREDIT CODE"
A bill' 0 5 to regulate consumer credit was introduced in
the South Carolina General Assembly, on January 26, 1972
and was subsequently referred to the Banking Committee. 0 6
This was the second proposal to the General Assembly for a
"South Carolina Consumer Credit Code."'1 7 Among its pro-
visions, this Act would address itself to the problem of the
consumer and door-to-door sales.
In comparing the "home solicitation sales" sections of
the U3C 08 with those of the 1972 South Carolina proposal, 00
it seems that they are virtually identical. However, instead of
defining a "home solicitation sale" as a sale solicited and
executed at the home of the buyer as the U3C prescribes, 9a
the 1972 South Carolina proposal only limits a "home solicita..
tion sale" to exclude a sale transacted, "[A] t a place under the
direct control or supervision of the seller.""10 This broadens
the scope of door-to-door sales coverage, by including those
sales consummated when the buyer is away from his residence
as well as those in his home. For example, this approach would
appear to cover the familiar selling method of the neighbor-.
hood housewares "party." Additionally, this would thwart
evasion of the statute by a seller establishing a temporary
102. Id. at §2.503.
103. UNIFORM CoNsuMER CREDIT CODE §2.501.
104. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT §§1.301(8) & (37).
105. No. S.792, S.C. CONSUMER CREDIr CODE (1972).
106. This had the effect of killing this proposal unless reintroduced.
107. There was an earlier proposal in Jan. of 1971, see note 116 infra.
108. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§2.501-.505.
109. No. S.792, §§14.201-.205.
109a. The proposal to be introduced in 1973 follows the U3C prescription
of defining a "home solicitation sale" as a sale solicited and executed at the
home of the buyer.
110. Id. at §14.201.
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neighborhood "office," and inducing the buyer to consummate
the transactions there, away from his home.11'
Prior to the introduction of the 1972 bill in South Caro-
lina, a committee was created 12 to study the problems asso-
ciated with consumer credit and to evaluate the UJC. Conse-
quently, a two year investigation was conducted with public
hearings in several areas of the state, allowing consumers to
voice their complaints and expert testimony to be heard.
1 3
This study culminated in a proposal introduced in January,
1971 to adopt the provisions of the U3C with approved amend-
ments. 114 In this 1971 proposal, the Committee amended two
of the U3C sections governing "home solicitation sales.""15
Recall that the U3C provision for disclosure of the buyer's
rights requires the statement that, "If you cancel, the seller
may keep all or part of your cash downpayment" to be in-
cluded' -6 and allows the seller to retain a cancellation fee from
the downpayment." 7 The South Carolina Committee rejected
the U3C provision for the cancellation fee and substituted in
the buyer's rights statement, the words, "If you cancel, the
seller must refund all of your cash downpayment. ' " 8Il The
Committee reasoned in amending these sections,
[t]hat the "RIGHT TO CANCEL" ordinarily implies a right to return
to the status quo. That being the case, a debtor can easily be induced
to part with a downpayment when convinced that he may "Cancel" in
three days if he changes his mind.1 1 9
In spite of this broad view, the drafters of the 1972 proposal
apparently rejected the reasoning for the 1971 amendments,
as the two sections were revised to conform strictly with the
U3C approach of permitting the cancellation fee. :20
111. These suggestions are similarly put forth in an article by Prof. Sher,
cited note 122 infra.
112. This Committee to study the U3C was created by Concurrent Resolu-
tion H.1291 adopted by the 1969 General Assembly.
113. Report, S.C. La. CoMM. TO STUDY THE UNIFORM CoNsUmER Cumrr
CODE (1971). For a summary of the complaints, see Report, Exhibit A. Also,
for a summary of the expert testimony, see Report at 5-12. (Hereinafter cited as
Report.)
114. Id. at 150 et seq.
115. Id. at 191-2.
116. UNIFOR-M CONSUMER CRrIT CODE §2.503(2) (b).
117. Id. at §2.504(3).
118. Report, at 191-2.
119. Id. at 145.
120. See bill cited note 109 supra §§14203(2) (b) & 14204(3).
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V. CONCLUSION
From the consumer's viewpoint,121 some legislative action
aimed at remedying the very real abuses in door-to-door sell-
ing is obviously better than none at all. Equally true however,
is the fact that some of the responses discussed above seem
to accomplish the task of protecting the home consumer, while
others seem to merely provide an illusion of that aim.
122
As we have seen, the scope of the statutory protection
is governed from the outset by the conceptual definition of
a "home solicitation sale." Under the U3C approach, the term
has been limited to credit transactions. 23 South Carolina's
several proposals aimed at the problems of door-to-door selling
have all followed the more narrow view of the U3C albeit the
physical locale is broader. 2 4 This approach is one that many
states have rejected in favor of including cash sales, although
in some cases only cash sales over a certain amount. 25 By
excluding cash sales as the U3C and the South Carolina pro-
posals advocate, a large loophole for the unethical seller is
created by which to defeat the intent of the statute. For ex-
ample, New York's statute similarly limits coverage to only
those transactions payable in four or more installments, es-
sentially a credit emphasis.126 One recent New York deci-
sion'27 however, brought a "layaway sale," which was solicited
at buyer's home and obligated buyer to only two payments, an
initial deposit and a delayed balance, within their statute. The
court was confronted with an attempt to evade the coverage
of the statute by disguising the sale as something other than
one encompassed by the statutory definition of an installment
sale. Aside from simply broadening the statutory protection,
inclusion of cash sales would preempt the possibility of this
situation arising and also preclude the possibility of the con-
121. For an analysis from the creditor's viewpoint, see Kripke, Consumer
Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUm L. REv. 445
(1968).
122. For a summary of the rationale behind the approach of the U3C pro-
visions for home solicitation sales, see Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in Door-
to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 717 (1968).
123. UNIFORM CONSUMR CREDIT CODE §2.501.
124. See notes 109 and 110 supra.
125. See notes 44-46 mupra.
126. See note 40 supra.
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sumer having to seek judicial relief to remedy such an at-
tempted evasion.
Additionally, the U3C approach prevents coverage of
home-solicited sales that were made pursuant to a pre-existing
revolving charge account or pursuant to prior negotiations
between the buyer and seller. 128 As pointed out, several states
have adopted this approach 129 as does the South Carolina
proposal. 130 On the other hand, some states have seen fit to
avoid such a restrictive course. Again, by adopting this restric-
tive provision, a very real problem in home solicitation sales
seems to have been disregarded. In many cases, the initial sale
is transacted in seller's place of business, with subsequent
credit sales being consummated through seller's representa-
tives visiting buyer's home. For example, purchases similar to
those in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furn. Co.,' 3 ' would not
be covered by the states subscribing to this U3C approach.
Although these sales were entered into in the home of the
plaintiff, Ora Lee Williams, they were subsequent to prior
dealings with the seller in his showroom. In Williams this
basis alone would have been sufficient to avoid the statutory
provisions of the U3C. It would be unrealistic to conclude that
this approach to door-to-door selling could not be easily manip-
ulated by the unscrupulous seller to thwart the purpose of the
whole enactment.
Along the same lines, the U3C idea of buyer waiving his
right to recision in "emergency" situations where he has
requested seller's immediate performance, 32 seems to further
limit the applicability of the cooling-off period. As has been
seen, some states have subscribed to this exclusion, 33 as have
the bills proposed in South Carolina. 34 To insure the volun-
tariness of the waiver, the District of Columbia statute re-
quires a separate, signed form, explaining the impact of the
waiver on the buyer's rights. 35 In addition, this formalism
128. UNsiFoa Cox s .ra Cpmarr CODE §2.501.
129. See note 57 supra.
130. See note 109 supra.
131. 350 F.2d 445 (1965). This case has been often cited to illustrate un-
conscionability in credit transactions.
132. See note 58 supra.
133. See note 59 supra.
134. See note 109 supra.
135. See note 60 & text supra.
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in the District of Columbia statute seems aimed at making
the buyer cognizant of what his waiver constitutes and also
serving as some evidence of the seller informing the buyer
that his waiver will preclude later cancellation. On the other
hand, any waiver at all opens the door to the possibility of
shoddy, inadequate performance by the unscrupulous seller
and the possibility of the glib-tongued salesman manipulating
the buyer into a "voluntary" loss of his rights. It would seem
that if the buyer attempted to unjustly enrich himself in the
absence of an emergency clause, by rescinding after seller's
performance or if the seller pursued a like course in the pres-
ence of such a clause, there should be equitable redress for
either injured party. The matter boils down to whether the
burden of enforcement of rights should be on the buyer or
the seller. In balancing these interests, it appears that seller
should assume this responsibility, as the predominant theme
in the problem of door-to-door selling seems to be character-
ized by the seller's abuse of the buyer and not the reverse.
Therefore, the approach followed by New Jersey'30 of not
enforcing any waiver by the buyer of his right to a cooling-off
period, would be more equitable and consonant with the over-
all policy.
Aside from the scope of the concepts of "home solicita-
tion sale" and waiver, there are additional problems encount-
ered in insuring that the right of rescission is a meaningful
protective device. In effect, the questions of the length of the
"cooling-off" period, disclosure of the buyer's rights and the
merit of a cancellation fee should be considered.
As previously stated, there seems to be general accord
in allowing a three-day period to rescind, exemplified by the
U3C and the South Carolina proposals. 37 At the same time,
there does seem to be some validity to the argument that a
longer period would be desirable in the case of an illiterate
or ignorant buyer, who presumably would be slower to seek
the advice of a more suspicious or knowledgeable person. This
argument is bolstered by the suggestion' 3" that the cancella-
tion fee, which statutes modeled on the U3C permit the seller
136. See note 61 supra.
137. See generally p. 888 supra.
138. Consumer Research Foundation, Critique of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, vol. II at 198 (Jan. 1971). This was a suggestion put forth by
Robert M. Berger in a comment on the U3C within this collection.
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to retain, does provide a quid pro quo rationale for a longer
period of rescission. The seller is merely paid for his uncer-
tainty throughout the period.
More precisely, the impact of the cancellation fee itself
seems of greater significance. The U3C approach adopted by
some statutes, provides for 5%o of the cash price, not to exceed
the downpayment, to be retained. 3 9 On the one hand, the
response to this has ranged from modification, by setting a
maximum on the amount of the fee, to the complete rejection
of the idea of any fee at all.140 In South Carolina the first
proposal of 1971 followed the course of total rejection of the
fee, however the later proposal reinstated the U3C 5% for-
mula. As pointed out, the rejection of the fee in the earlier
South Carolina proposal was premised on the idea that such
a fee was in conflict with the very idea of rescission, connoting
a return to the status quo. Generally, one of the basic argu-
ments against the fee has been aptly summarized:
Such a charge is a payment to the wrongdoer for the wrongdoing;
he (seller) has all to gain (most buyers won't know enough to can-
cel) and nothing to lose (those that do cancel will still yield for him
more than enough to pay a salesman and cover overhead) by practicing
fraud & oppression. 143
Furthermore, the fee would appear to work the greatest hard-
ship on low-income groups; the same group that the right of
rescission should be primarily designed to protect. Conse-
quently, the cancellation fee seems to render the right of re-
scission a less meaningful device for protecting the consumer
from abusive home solicitation.
Although theoretically charged with knowledge of the
law, the buyer as a practical matter may not know of his right
of rescission, if he has one, and even if he does, will be less
likely to know of the specific provisions involved. To sum-
marize, there are states which fail to specify any particulars
as to disclosure of the buyer's rights. 44 While on the other
hand the formalism specified in some statutes ranges from
separate disclosure forms and even disclosure of rights in
139. See notes 64-66 supra.
140. See notes 68-74 supra.
141. See note 105 supra.
142. See note 118 supra.
143. Consumer Research Foundation, supra note 138.
144. See note 80 supra.
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dual languages in large urban centers, to requiring in addi-
tion to a written disclosure, that the seller must communicate
these rights to buyer at the time of sale. 45 The U3C approach,
which the South Carolina proposals have emulated, 146 falls
somewhere in between, as it does provide for a disclosure
of the rights in the agreement, however goes no further. In
evaluating these responses, it seems only too apparent that a
meaningful exercise of the rescission right is dependent on the
buyer being able to adequately assess the situation. Once
again if the intent of the statute is to protect those most
abused, in effect low-income groups, the requisite formality
of disclosure should turn on what would be sufficient to alert
the average member of that group.
Finally, the range of innovations that some statutes have
introduced and which have no parallel in the U3C, evidence the
existence of very real problems. Other areas of in-home selling
for which the U3C provisions are inadequate include sales
solicited by telephone, such as catalog sales, 147 and mail and
bait advertising. 1 48 Some states in responding to these prob-
lems certainly realized that abuses exist in other areas than
just those personally solicited. For example, allowing rescis-
sion if the goods have not been received thirty days after the
transaction 41 stresses the difficulties raised by delivery prob-
lems. In short, if the consumer is really to be protected from
the abuses in in-home selling, these broader remedial and
procedural provisions would seem to be essential.
In opening the area of door-to-door selling to legislative
consideration in 1968, the U3C served a vital innovative func-
tion in allowing some protection to the home consumer. Using
this proposal as a guide, a patchwork of legislative responses
resulted through the development of variations and innova-
tions. While the normative responses to the U3C suggest pos-
sible socio-economic stimuli as the causation for the differ-
entials, it is apparent from the innovations that have arisen
in a totally unrelated manner, that the initiative stems not
from specific reactions to indigenous problems, but from a
145. See notes 81-84 mpra.
146. See notes 109 & 115 supra.
147. See notes 89-91 supra.
148. See notes 92-93 supra.
149. See note 95 supra.
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response to broader policy considerations inherent in the
common problem.
For states like South Carolina which are in search of a
legislative response, the key to a progressive and realistic
solution seems not to be in the emulation of an approach that
has been recognized as inadequately dealing with many of the
problems in door-to-door selling, but to examine the innovative
ideas and directions recent legislation has initiated as indicia
of the current needs which must be meaningfully answered
if the abuses in this area are to be adequately remedied. In
looking into the future of consumer protection in "home solici-
tation sales," to anticipate additional problems for which cov-
erage should be provided, it is suggested that the proposed
National Consumer Act' 50 is a guide for response, which
seems to offer a progressive and realtistic solution to the
problem.
BFAUFORT J. B. CLARiKE
150. See notes 99-104 supra.
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